I couldn't find a better way to publish my put-on-hold-forever blog other than lunching it with my shy attempt to probe the question of identity. This paper is an ongoing project to understand the complexity of the question of identity in Sudan as well as its ramifications on peace and stability. Please feel free to share and comment while maintaining ethical/copyright measures in case of reproduction any part of the text.
Why
Do We Need to Build a New Sudanese National Identity?
Opening Statement:
Many of
you might be fidgeting as they read the title that suggests the necessity, and
the urgency, of building a national identity.
I also know that many scholars are not happy about the term nationalism
either. I happened to agree with this
notion, too. However, I am still using
the tern national identity in my paper thus my premise. But, what do I mean when I say a new national
identity? What I mean is creating a political system, a culture, and set of
policies that accept multi identities and do not give superiority to any
component of those identities. This
multi identity is the identity for which I am vouching. Creating this new multi-identity does not
suggest dismissing individual's choices or associations with their
sub-identities or affiliations. However,
those sub-identities should not determine one's rights or citizenship. The modern state concept about nationality
and citizenship should not be based on how Muslimized you are or how Arabaized
you are. All citizens should equally
enjoy their rights based on set of rules and laws that at the same time
respects each individual's believes and affiliations. What I am suggesting here is bringing the
current Sudan to the track of creating a modern state. ______________________________________________________
Why it matters?
Growing
up in Saudi to Nubian parents made me more Sudanese than I thought I would. The
surrounding was not welcoming so becoming a Sudanese and to precise a Nubian
was my mechanism of separating me from the prevailing culture. When I visited
Sudan, I noticed that I am actually not Sudanese enough neither to my clan or
the center culture. Assimilation seemed harder than just talking the language
or having roots. As I got involved in politics, I was often told that “you
don’t sound or act Sudanese.” This got me thinking of what is “Sudanese”
anyway. According to media and every-day interactions, a legit Sudanese is a
Muslim Arab individual. Lacking one of those criteria puts one at risk and
lower status immediately. Alwad al nas is an expression that is loosely used and
attributes that the holder of this badge is form an Arab tribe and of course
Muslim mohaid.
Turning Outward: The Research
I took
my agonizing question to the next level by writing this paper to probe the
roots of the identity question. This paper was part of my independent class on
Sudan in my graduate studies. I conducted a small scale research to group of
friends between the age of 23 and 60 and I asked them a simple question “what
makes them Sudanese?” The answers were
intriguing. I should note that my pool for this brainstorming is limited since
I am targeting only those who have fair knowledge of English and have access to
the internet. I wish I could conduct similar research on a larger scale with
more detailed questions and see what the answers would yield. 
• The participants, regardless of their
locations or backgrounds, find it harder to belong to the existing identity of
Arab-Islam; I think its due to modernization. However, few youth think they are
Arabs, and surprisingly, they lived in the GCC and this made them think that
being an arab equates superiority.
• Some youth never thought of themselves
as Sudanese despite the fact that they live in Sudan! they found it easier to
associate themselves with their other sub-identities such as sects, tribes, and
socioeconomic class.
• As for older generation (41- 60), they
identify with what they had been told when they were younger or their
experience in post- independence years where nationalistic ideas and communism
were flourishing. However, nothing is in common when it comes to what makes
them "Sudanese."
• I am afraid that the notion of identity
is too fluid to be defined; which could be useful if we were to provide a
definition based on citizenship i.e. rights and obligations. I'd suggest
providing citizenship rights and values divorced from religion or race
privilege could be useful.
______________________________________________________
The Current "We" and its Implications
The
perception of the duality of Arab-Muslim
becomes toxic when it gets thrown into the politics. During the uprising
following the Arab Spring, the public took moral stands and position based on
how one is wad nas or not. By the same token, people reacted to human rights
violations and the war and atrocity in war zones. Things happening in Darfur
seemed far from home. When a couple of protesters from affluent background was
shot Sudan was roaring. Hundreds took the streets. But, a year before that,
when 12 students were shot in the day light in Ramadan in Nyla, Khartoum was
mute. Arresting political activists form certain ethnicity was met by apathy.
Many would argue that this is not a case to generalize but I would say, actions
speak louder than words and wishful thinking statements. I remember once, a photo of one female
activist who wore her hair short at the time got people talking about how “she
is not Sudanese” and it seems that was enough reason not sympathizes with her.
______________________________________________________
Who is Sudanese ?
Who is Sudanese ?
One can
easily replace the word Nigerian with Sudanese and get the same feeling among
Sudanese. Answering the question of identity for most of the Sudanese is a
dreaded task. Songs and proverbial
sayings suggest that a typical Sudanese person is that one from the North or
the Center -- one who dresses in a certain way with Jalabiah and Emmah, speaks
Arabic, and, of course, a Muslim. Cartoonists, even those who are critical of
the government, portray the mainstream Sudanese person as a Shimali [mainstream
Northern]. The first line in
the Sudanese national anthem says, “We are God’s soldiers and home-country’s
soldiers,” and within the aforementioned context of religious polarization, one
can assume that the God in this context is the God of the Muslims.
On their part, women also should meet certain
criteria to be considered as proper “Sudanese.” They are expected to look like
those typical women from the North and Center. Accordingly, most of the time
beauty standards do not include or celebrate African features. They are expected to wear the toub if they
were married, or the hijab if they are single, with both are not the
instinctive choice of clothing to many women across the country. The Islamic Movement made special efforts to
make women central to their ideology. I would refer you to the work of Dr.
Sondra Hale who had wrote on the topic at length. In songs and love poems, coveted women have
light complexion, wide eyes, and silky hair.
That model is remotely far from the prevailing average features of most
women in society, which is a mixture of races and ethnicities with distinct
African characteristics.
This
imposition of the dual Arab-Muslim Sudanese identity was at the expense of the
rich diverse ethnicities and cultures of the Sudan. Thus, all that cultural diversity was molded,
forcibly, into one mainstream persona that the media, the literatures, and the
cultural songs celebrated as the “Arab” and “Muslim” Sudan. It is hard to find a nationalist song that
does not emphasize the Arab or the Muslim identities. Other local and regional songs or works of
art that do not revolve around that duality, are suppressed and are rarely
presented, except during “cultural weeks” as if they were not significant
components of the national heritage and identity. The culture of the center has been dependent
on the center of political powers, which promoted the image of “who is to be
considered Sudanese?” It made it
inevitable to associate that with being of light complexion Arab, and of course
a Muslim. This sentiment has been
nourished, promoted and accumulated since the times of slavery and throughout
the successive regimes. That elites’
narrative culminated in brutal civil wars and conflicts.
______________________________________________________
The Current "we": Where did it come from?
The Current "we": Where did it come from?
The
contemporary Sudan, which was first created as a politically defined entity by
the British and Egyptian Colonial rule in 1899, was the largest country in
Africa until the split of the Southern part in 2011. It comprised the largest number of tribes and
ethnic identities in any African or Middle Eastern country with “all the major
defined languages in Africa, except the Khoisan of South Africa,” as R.C.
Stevenson had noted . Accordingly, we
can understand why the Sudan was referred to as the “Microcosm of Africa” or “Africa in miniature” .
Despite
the fact that masses of the people, even from neighboring countries, over the
centuries have intermingled, lived peacefully together and shared activities
and transactions in economic and agricultural domains, one can notice a very
vibrant interracial and interethnic bonding during the struggle for
independence --namely the Mahdist Revolution of 1881-1885 and the 1924
Revolution. However, there was also very
strong opposition from leadership of tribal, sectarian and economic interests
to both revolutions that resulted in deep polarization.
Fast
forward after independence in the 1960s and the 1970s, the Islamist movement,
in the form of the political organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, was added
to the political, social and religious mix, and out of that discourse. One can only imagine the dilemma of the
powerless educated class in figuring out their identity, and how to appeal to
the masses to mobilize them towards creating a nation-state.
To fit in
To
survive and to be accepted, the majority in Sudan were forced to assimilate,
either by converting to Islam or by accepting the dominance of that imposed
identity. However, the southern region
of Sudan, which was deliberately separated from the North and underdeveloped by
the colonial administration in what was known as the Closed District Ordinance,
was yet to experience a similar fate.
Ironically,
the Arabs perceive the Northern Sudanese, who identify and assume that they are
Arabs, as less eligible for those linkages.
Gerard Prunier noted, “[F]or the ‘Arabs’ at least, they are not
completely sure of what and who they are.
In the Sudan they are ‘Arabs’, but in the Arab world they are seen as
mongrels who hardly deserve that name. They desperately strive for recognition
of their ‘Arab’ status by other Arabs, who tend to look down on them – even
using for them the dreaded name of abed (slave) that they use for those more
black than they are.”
The
Sudanese
elites were, and still are, mainly from the center or the north, and often
times, associates of one of the sectarian groups. There are few exceptions though from
different parts of the Sudan who happened to have lived in the capital for
generations and were assimilated into the social fabric and gained influence in
various sectors. Nevertheless, within
those closed circles, those detribalized northerners still would regard them as
inferior for their African backgrounds.
Because of their blackness, they were referred to as “former slaves”
despite the fact that they had lived in the city for generations. “Until recently, calling the Southern
Sudanese “slaves”, abeed, to their faces was a common practice,” Deng
writes.
Through
practice and policy, the Arab-Muslim identity became the de facto feature that
entitles an individual to be qualified as a potential leader. Despite the dominance of non-Muslim and
non-Arab identities in the South, the post-independence governments imposed
Arab-Muslim identity through policies and forced assimilation. Since independence, Southern Sudanese, as
well as Christians, were excluded from the power equation. There were no efforts on the part of the
colonial regime or the Sudanese political elites to share power with the
Southerners. Southerners were perceived as unqualified for leadership.
Why is it problematic?
Exclusive Powers
The
deep-rooted desire to be an Arab necessitated a sense of superiority over the
blacks in society, which still causes contention between sentiments of the
cohesive dominant ruling class and the rest of the diverse population. Policies of the successive regimes and
elites’ discourse accumulated those contentions and eventually mushroomed in
civil wars and conflicts.
Rejecting Diversity
With
any evidence except the perception of the elites, the interim constitution of
2005 stated that the Arabic is the most popular national language; therefore,
it is considered the official language in addition to English in higher
education institution. In his famous
speech in Ghadarif, in Eastern Sudan President Omar Al-Bashir asserted this
notion of Sudan that is Muslim and Arabic speaker. He stated, “if southern Sudan secedes, there
will be no time to speak of diversity of culture and ethnicity in the north,
where Islam will be the only religion and Arabic will be the only
language.” Clearly, Al-Bashir statement
overlooked the depth of diversity of Sudan, including Darfur, Southern
Kordofan, Eastern and Northern Sudan as well as all other areas. President Bashir emphasized that the Sudan
after session of the South has become a new Sudan that is only Muslim,
Arabic-speaking, and ruled by fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia law.
This
conception of Sudan has been brewing for decades. The cheering for al-Bashir’s
speech is sadly genuine for it came from masses that have been told repeatedly
that they are Arabs and gatekeepers of Islam.
Diversity for such masses only means ‘less purity’ which they cannot
accept any more. There are many
documentaries the have been produced about the separation of the South in which
Northern Sudanese were not ashamed to say clearly that they wanted the South to
go its way because “they do not look like us.” The assumption that everybody
should look the same for the sense of unity to be established is a hidden cause
that makes Sudanese in the north so much indifferent towards the war in Darfur,
for example.
______________________________________________________
The price we paid
The price we paid
The
long war between the North and South came to a peace agreement in 2005. The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) enacted a referendum rights for the
southerners in 2011 to decide their destiny.
The reactions about the referendum reflected deep apprehension among the
Sudanese and especially among those from the Islamic Movement in the
region. For example, an affiliate of the
Muslim Brotherhood rejected the peace agreement and objected the notion of
making unity a favorable choice for the Southerners. His argument is that peace with the South and
unity will jeopardize Sudan’s Arab-Muslim identity, warning that Sudan is about
to become an “African secular state.”
This fear is shared by the elites in the Sudanese government whose
action did not reflect their unity rhetoric speech. Muslim radicals blamed the Sudanese
government for accepting south Sudan's referendum on independence. Apparently, they seemed more concerned with
the application of Sharia law more than protecting the Arab identity where
“they demanded imposition of Islamic Shar'iah law in the entire country whether
citizens of the mainly Christian region of south Sudan like it or not.” On a similar vine, Yusuf al-Qardawi, an
Islamic theologian, stated in his broadcast on Al Jazeera, that Muslims voting
in favor of the separation is forbidden.
He was keen on the unity of Muslims and did not consider the right of
the non-Muslims to determine their density.
Sixty scholars form Azhar joined his call and issued a fatwa stating
that voting for referendum is a sin.
After
the referendum that lead to the separation of the South, the Just Peace Forum
(JPF), a radical Islamist party, headed by Al Tayeb Mustafa, a veteran Islamist
figure and President Bashir’s maternal uncle, slaughtered a black “bull” in
celebration of the separation of the South.
Photo (1) Despite the fact that
the ruling party condemned the act, the official narrative usually insinuated
similar meanings even if it was not expressed in actions like slaughtering a
black bull.
In April
of the same year, Mustafa called on the Sudanese people to donate money for the
mass deportation of the Southern Sudanese.
A gesture that was not out of kindness as it was meant to express the
North’s eagerness to get rid of the “blacks” even if they have to pay money for
that.
Tribalism
The
current regime introduced tribalism as another dimension to the crises of
identity, as the core of government’s power lies among northern tribes. The regime had made it clear that affiliation
with the Islamic movement was not enough to get to higher ranks. Recently, the government issued directives
that made specifying the tribal affiliation a requirement for issuing the
national identifications card. Ironically, that was identical to a policy
introduced over a hundred years ago by the colonial regime. The nationalists vehemently opposed that
policy at the time, and insisted on refusing such classifications. Now, it is
mandated by this national government after over a century.
In the
prevailing sense of insecurity, resorting to one’s tribe gives a sense of
solidarity. Hence, Sudanese people are now more inclined to seek their tribal
lineages than before. That can be
highlighted by a public speech of President Omar Al-Bashir in 2010 when he
stated that Farouk Abu Eissa, head of the Sudan's opposition umbrella alliance,
the National Consensus Forces (NCF), has no tribe to defend him. In his attempt to validate his point of
view, Al-Bashir commended the sectarian parties for their religious affiliation
and the blessings of tribal support.
Al-Bashir said that in response to Abu Eissa’s statement on the
referendum criticizing the government’s inadequate efforts to promote
unity. That incident was not isolated
from the ruling party’s practices of condescending tone towards those without
tribal affiliation and those who are not “Arabs.” In an interview with Al-Turabi, he told a
story that President al-Bashir did not condemned the reports of the raping of a
Darfurain woman but rather perceived it as a token of honor for that Darfurian
woman because she was sought by a “Jaali”, even without her consent. This attitude is ingrained in the
master-slave mindset that dominates the political discourse in Sudan.
Aggressions against non-Muslims
The
Sudanese Interim National Constitution (INC) enacted in 2005 cites Islamic law
as the sole source of legislation.
According to the Ministry of Information, Christians make up 3 percent
of the population. Apostasy from Islam
is legally punishable by death under the Article 126 of the 1991 Criminal
Act. On the contrast, the government
promotes conversion to Islam and prohibits proselytization.
Non-Muslim
participation in politics and holding position improved after the peace
agreement in 2005. However, since the
separation of South Sudan, no non-Muslim Sudanese has been assigned to a
high-level position apart from those pragmatically associated with the ruling
party.
In late
2010 prior to the referendum, and in manifestation of the dogmatic perception
of the Sudanese identity, Al-Bashir stated in a public speech that Sudan would
apply Sharia law once the Southerners vote for separation. “But the opaque talk
[about] the Sudanese people I don’t know what…is multi-racial and
multi-religious, the [Islamic] Shari’a will be the main source for
lawmaking….and Arabic language will the official language of the state as will
be stipulated in the upcoming constitution,” Bashir added dismissing the
diversity of Sudan. Subsequently,
radicals saw his remarks a green light to compromise the rights of the
non-Muslims in Sudan. In 2012, and in light of the reoccurring conflict between
Sudan and South Sudan over city of Heglig, Muslim mob set ablaze a Catholic
church frequented by Southern Sudanese in the capital Khartoum. The Sudanese Salfist group denied
reasonability of the attack and claimed that the church incident was
ill-managed dispute over the land’s ownership, and they rejected the
speculations that it was an act of hate against Castilians. However, the act is more of purging the land
of Muslims of the Christian and the Southern. Friday sermons in neighboring
mosques called for restoring the land for it belongs to Muslims. The attack against churches was not an
isolated incident. Similar acts against
churches were committed against churches in Wad Madani in 2011.
Stagnation of Political Change
Calls
for change in Sudan are mainly focused on changing the regime. There are shy attempts by the intellectuals
and the elites to address the racial issue. However, those attempts remain
isolated and for elites’ circle consumption.
The calls and the visions are not disseminated in the grassroots’
level. Bitter youth who are in direct
touch with the mass highlight the social problems and attribute them to the
regime without digging deeper into the latent factors. Thus, activists often time act as dilettantes
with no cohesive vision. Despite the
reviving activism in Sudan, it does not seem to be able to see beyond the
toppling of the regime. The danger in
this lack of vision is hindering the efforts of political change because
political change is a reflection of social change.
One of
major hindrance of social change is Sudan is the realization of the roots of
the problem and addressing them instead of addressing the symptoms. Activists emphasize the official narrative
and policies without asking the crucial question: why are people receptive to
this narrative? Answering this question will help unfold the puzzlement of
racism and intolerance to non-Muslims.
The simplest answer is that the government is striking on acquainted
cords and humming a familiar song.
Arab-Islam identity is not anew phenomena invented by the current
government. As matter of fact, the existing culture empowers the narrative the
government’s narrative and cements its authority. Despite the plausible complexity, is not
impossible to change and mold social values to be more inclusive and tolerant
to diversity. The Sudanese national identity is made and can be remolded and
reconfigured if there is a solid social movement with broad platform. Nevertheless, social change defenders should
first clarify and prioritize their goals.
Changing social values is not solely dependent on social media slogan
and ranting op-eds. There are socioeconomic dimensions that should be
considered. In addition, social change
entrepreneurs should work on laying the ground for social change by building
trust between them and the public to counter the government propaganda that
claims that social change are act of erratic.
Calls
for change will remain ineffective unless the recipients are not occupied by
eking out their day-to-day income.
Expanding the middle class thus diversifying socioeconomic interaction
will create a new sphere that is not dependent on pedigree and patronage. This shift will enable people to be more
“autonomous in defining their social role themselves and shaping their social
ties to other people.”
Also,
the most affected people by racial prejudice are those in warzones. Addressing the peace question is essential to
pave the way for social change. A public
that is hypnotized into believing that Islam-Arab identity is superior will not
demand the end of war in areas perceived as less Sudanese.
In
conclusion, social change is a process and it is gradual. Addressing the racial issue in Sudan, which
is part and parcel of the national identity question, requires multilayered efforts that involve
the government and the civil society.
Civil society efforts will not be optimized unless institutional
policies are cooperative. Attaining
social change and sustaining its accomplishments require both defenders and
policies
Development
There
are also two crucial factors that contribute to introducing social change that
promotes diversity: economic development and human development. These two factors entail including the
government in the equation since the government controls policies pertaining to
them. Balancing this equation is a
challenge. On one hand, the current government has no stake in promoting such
social change that jeopardizes its authority.
On the other hand, civil society and activism cannot crack the hard
shells of society without enjoying civil and political liberties.
According
to Ingleheart and Welzel, “socioeconomic development is crucial because it
impacts powerfully on people’s existential conditions and their chance of
survival.” in a country like Sudan
poverty rate is 46.5% and has been in a state of war for more than two decades
that resulted in displacing two million people, survival values triumph
self-expression values by far. Poverty
reduction will not only enhance people’s live but it will also extenuate
material constrains that influence human choices and their ability to think
beyond their existential security. This
factor is evident in Sudan that has witnessed two popular revolutions in the
1960s and 1980s. Between 1960 and 1985,
Sudan’s GDP was relatively steady. On
the contrary, current annual growth is (-0.60) percent.
______________________________________________________
The potential “we”
what do
I mean when I say a new national identity? What I mean is creating a political
system, a culture, and set of policies that accept multi identities and do not
give superiority to any component of those identities. This multi identity is the identity for which
I am vouching. Creating this new
multi-identity does not suggest dismissing individual's choices or associations
with their sub-identities or affiliations.
However, those sub-identities should not determine one's rights or
citizenship. The modern state concept
about nationality and citizenship should not be based on how Muslimized you are
or how Arabaized you are. All citizens
should equally enjoy their rights based on set of rules and laws that at the
same time respects each individual's believes and affiliations. What I am suggesting here is bringing the
current Sudan to the track of creating a modern state.
______________________________________________________
How?
Efforts
of activist and politicians should transfer into advocacy that addresses laws
and policies. The example of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in the USA
could be implemented in Sudan. During
the early decades of the twentieth century, the NAACP focused on the
citizenship rights and equal protection for the African Americans. Social workers played an integral part in
educating grassroots thus cultivating the mass to support the association
demands that paved the way for the civil rights movements decades later. The following section suggests more
recommendations:
1. National
Dialogue and Reality-Check
There
are many lessons to draw from the long civil war with the South when it comes
to addressing the identity crisis in Sudan.
It will be an effective strategy to gradually but consistently promote a
new identity that is based on citizenship rights and obligations. The representation of this new identity
should be flexible and more tolerant towards the non-Arab ethnicities and the
non-Muslims. This reversal of course to
unite the people can utilize the same factors that instigated the
differences. Religion could be employed
to bring unity among the Muslims themselves first, as difficult as that might
be due to the other latent factor, i.e., ethnicity, or precisely the sense of
purity. Francis Deng argues “genetic
composition of the country does not support any claims to racial or cultural
purity, far less superiority, since there is a significant African element in
the North that still links the population to the non-Arab groups within the
North and the South.” Building on Deng’s
argument in addressing the racial issue from the perspective of similarity
rather than purity, could ease the tension and the divisive sense of
entitlement that prevails among the Northerners. This realistic approach will not accepted by
those who believe blindly in their Arabism and by-default superiority. However, this approach should be combined
with incentives for those hardliners.
The incentive should be another common factor that unites people, which
is peace. The term peace sounds vague
and elusive if it is not followed by what it entails. Conversely, the meaning of war and insecurity
is more tangible to a population that has been in warring state for half a
centaury. One of the ways to perpetuate
and implement this conversation is by promoting a national dialogue, that would
allow all ethnicities, occupations, equally representative gender and age, as
well as the government, to express themselves openly. The objective should be reaching a middle
ground that upholds what “unites” them and commit them to maintain that
platform and spirit of common interest.
Conceivably,
many might find it hard to shed their “Arabness”, which is understandable,
because of the lack of more concrete alternative sense of identity that feeds
the need for pride. Others will find it
hard to get a sense of pride out of their African heritage after years of
bitter sense of inferiority. What
Sudanese people need to know is that they ought to find other tangible sources
of national pride instead of clinging to illusionary glorious roots that are
sometimes hard to prove. In this regard
the media and intellectual production from literary, theatrical, musical,
poetic and artistic expressions can use subtle messages to promote that spirit
of unity, and make it appealing to aspire for.
An excellent example of this was manifested during the struggle for independence
and oppressive military dictatorships.
Those venues worked wonders in mobilizing the messes despite their
racially and linguistically biased content.
The
next phase of this process should expose the crimes committed and the suffering
of others in emotionally upsetting strategies and tactics. Here again the venues and vehicles mentioned
above can do the job, but carefully, so as not cause it to backfire. The rich example of the American Civil Rights
Movement from poetry to street theater to novels and musicals, such as Le Roy
Jones (later on named himself Amiri Baraka), James Baldwin and Billie Holiday,
etc. But what is crucial is that the
government should allow the process to take place. The oppressed should be
allowed to air their grievances and return home untouched. The pro-government, the radicals, and the
most outcasts, should say what they believe, state their arguments, and get a
concise counterargument with a layouts and suggestions instead of angry slurs
and exchange of accusations.
The
process then should look inward for answers, just like a genuine soul
search. One of the means of unpacking
the social issues is inter-group dialogue.
“Intergroup dialogue potentiates a democratic process that acknowledges
and respects all parties, creates a context that reinforces the notion that
change is possible.” It builds trust
among the rivals, which is key to bringing together the sides of society that
had been apart for decades. This will take time. However, what is important is starting on a
right note and initiating the first steps with integrity. The hope is in the younger generations.
2. Reforms
Reforms
refers here to an overall reform of policies, practiced and undeclared, such as
those privileges of one race or group over others. The mechanism for insuring
compliance and honest implementation starts with awareness of the importance of
the initiative. Involving people in the process and allowing them to have
ownership of the ideas grant higher chances of compliance and commitment.
Reforms
should also address education and the media apparatus. The current performance of those institutions
had reproduced the divisive factors rather than creating unity in the country.
Media and education should encourage aspects of unity and combat messages that
inflame differences among the population. School curriculums and media
programming should be reflective and respective of the diverse society without
favoring one culture over the other. The
aim of those institutions should be celebrating the diverse aspects of the
country as is without passing judgment. People should associate themselves with
their country based on the sense of liberty they enjoy to be who they are and
not what they are perceived to be.
3. Involvement
The
sense of belonging to a nation is a process.
Therefore, people should develop a mechanism by which they reach an
agreed upon vision of a future Sudan that is inclusive and mature, while
emphasizing the fact that each person’s effort is vital for materializing this
vision.
______________________________________________________
Conclusion
Ideally,
people should be free to identify themselves with any group, tribe, or culture,
and therefore, choose religion, mindset, and language through which they would
like to express themselves. That can be successful when those affiliations do
not obstruct other people's right to similarly practice their rights of
choice. A chosen identity becomes a
problem once a group decides to override the other groups’ right to
"be".
The
case in Sudan is a complex matter. On one hand, there are tribal affiliations
that vary in their roots. Some of the tribes claim strong lineages with the
Arabs and others are at peace with their African roots. The conflicts between
the two groups arises when the Arab tribes assume dominant status over the
African tribes to the extent of posing threats to their existence, as was the
case in Southern Sudan and in Darfur, where successive governmental policies
and institutions promoted the supremacy of the Arabic culture.
The
current Sudan's identity is a mix of Islam and tribalism. However, in some instances race and tribal
identification are overriding the religious ties. The government is aware of this fact and
therefore is playing the tribal/racial card and is using the religious
propaganda to maintain its control over the majority of Muslim population. The continuation of war in several parts of
Sudan, after the separation of the South in the 2011, proves that religion was
not the main reason behind that, as the ruling party had always alleged.
However,
the two components of the imposed Sudanese identity, Arabism and Islam, are
fluid enough to be reproduced and disseminated by the intellectuals in many
subtle ways. The intellectuals, who are
mainly from the social units that are influenced by Islam and Arabism,
unintentionally, promoted the same identity that they though they are
fighting. That is because they fought it
from the perspective of the privileged and not from that of the oppressed. Hence, the gap between the intellectuals and
those who come from societies that do not meet the criteria of the elites grew
wider as the marginalized kept on being pushed to the other antagonistic
circle. Those who are not Arabs have been forced to think of themselves
according to that reality or to choose to get away from their indigenous
characteristics so as not to be excluded from the hegemonic circle. However, claiming links with the Arabs, or
assimilation with the Arab identity consciously validates one's association
with Islam. There is also another factor
that makes the Arab component of the Sudanese population very dogmatic in their
association, due to the attitude they face from the Arabs. The sense of insecurity and the fact that
they are denied their right to be "Arabs" force them to turn the table
of this discrimination against those who have less Arab affiliation or
identification.
The
other problematic sub-identity in Sudan is religion. Despite the fact that
Islam, and religion in general, could unite adversarial tribes, it could also
splinter the population into two distinctive groups: Muslims and
non-Muslims. This was evident in the
civil war in the South. The separation
of the South made Sudanese realize that their conflicts are not merely based on
religious differences, although they complicate the problem.
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